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The time is right for Trills, a new security that would offer great 
direct benefit to Canadians as well as to the Government of Canada.
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THE PENSION PAPERSThis study proposes that the Government of Canada issue a new debt security, the
“Trill,” which would essentially offer Canadian investors an equity stake in the
Canadian economy. The Trill is so-named because its coupon payment would be
one-trillionth of Canada’s GDP. Similar to shares issued by corporations paying a
fraction of corporate earnings in dividends, the Trill would pay a fraction of the
“earnings” of Canada. Coupon payments would rise and fall with the GDP.
For average investors, the Trill would be a useful new source of income, offering
both exposure to income growth and protection against inflation. This security
would also appeal to large institutional investors. Pension funds have a need to
match their long-term liabilities with assets that can provide stable, long-term cash
flows. Currently, a large part of fund assets are held in nominal fixed-coupon
Government of Canada securities. These securities do not provide protection from
inflation and the limited numbers of real return bonds the government issues do not
provide exposure to income growth.
For Government, Trills would also be beneficial. The authors show the cost of
issuing Trills would be low, possibly less than some current government securities.
Trills would have the additional benefit of providing a natural hedge against budget
shortfalls, thus improving the government’s ability to achieve its goal of more stable
funding. Most promisingly, the proceeds could be used to fund federal government
obligations that are currently unfunded.
The study uses an asset pricing model to evaluate federal government employee and
veteran future benefits, the likely characteristics of a Trill. The authors show that the
securities would offer an attractive combination of risk and return for investors.
Trills are an asset that cannot be replicated with existing assets, and would allow
investors new portfolio diversification strategies that preserve high returns and lower
volatility. 
The issuer and the investor both stand to gain from Trills, making it a win-win
financial innovation.
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P
erhaps the most pressing issue
today for pension fund managers
and, thus, investors saving for
retirement, is the availability of assets
that will provide stable long-term cash
flows to fund expected payments to
pensioners.
Traditionally, a large part of any pension plan’s
holdings has been in fixed-income assets such as
long-duration government bonds. Pension funds
typically hold about 25 percent to 30 percent of
their net assets in fixed-income and inflation-
protected bonds, highlighting the importance of
very low risk securities. The Government of
Canada currently issues a range of such debt
instruments, including short-term and long-term
debt with either nominal or real coupon payments.
The largest portion of this debt is short-term,
nominal-fixed coupon, which serves a primary
objective of the federal government’s debt strategy:
providing  a source of stable, low-cost funding for
its operations. 
In this Commentary, we make the case for the
Government of Canada to issue a new security, one
that we believe would offer great direct benefit to
Canadian citizens as well as the Government of
Canada. This new security would have its coupon
tied to Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP).
Ideally, this security would be long term in
maturity, perhaps even perpetual. Such a security
would be attractive to private and public pension
funds, as it would provide access to a broader range
of income-earning potential in Canada. We believe
this new debt instrument would also be of interest
to the government for its stabilizing influence on
the budget (as coupon payments would fall with
declining budget revenues).
A small-denomination GDP share, for example,
might pay a coupon each year of one-trillionth of
that year’s GDP, or about $1.40 at current levels.
On this basis, we propose the name “Trill” be used
to refer to this new security. Similar to shares issued
by corporations paying a fraction of corporate
earnings in dividends, the Trill would pay a fraction
of the “earnings” of Canada. Given the
characteristics of GDP growth, our valuation of the
Trill indicates its yield would be very attractive to
the issuer, the Government of Canada – and, for
the same reasons, would be a useful new source of
income to investors who want exposure to income
growth and protection against inflation.
Why Investors Need Trills 
Because nominal GDP would be used to determine
the Trill’s coupon value, the inflation-protection
properties of the Trill would resemble that of
Canada’s Real Return Bonds (RRBs) and the US
Treasury’s Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS).
Inflation protection alone would be sufficient to
generate interest in Trills comparable to that which
exists for RRBs and TIPS. Further interest would
be generated by an additional desirable charac-
teristic of Trills; namely, that their coupons would
respond to variations in GDP. Trills would protect
relative standards of living in retirement, since 
they are a constant share of GDP, in contrast to an 
RRB or TIPS, which purchase a declining real
share of a growing GDP over time.
The recent successful effort by the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) to take over BCE
Inc. is an example of pension plans’ thirst for 
long-duration assets. Matching cash inflows and
outflows is at the heart of any pension fund
investment strategy since pension obligations
stretch out over decades. Many plans, such as
OTPP, offer benefits that are linked to wages as
they accrue and to inflation once they are in pay.
Investing in real assets and inflation-protected
bonds are two ways these plans seek to generate
steady, inflation-protected income flows.
There is a wide range of assets currently available
to large pension plans. These include: municipal,
provincial, territorial and federal government
bonds; international government and real return
(inflation-protected) bonds and debt; domestic and
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foreign publicly traded equities; derivatives (such
as equity swaps and futures, exchange-traded
futures contracts and foreign-exchange forwards);
commercial paper, bank notes, mortgages, private
equity, real estate and infrastructure assets. A
reasonable person might wonder, what more does
the market need? 
Although the availability of publicly traded debt,
equity and derivative securities, as well as private
equity assets, makes for a fairly comprehensive
menu with which to diversify a portfolio, these
securities represent a small fraction of the wealth of
the nation. Wages, salaries and supplementary
labour income make up roughly two-thirds of
Canada’s GDP, but trading on claims to these
income flows is essentially closed off to markets and
investors. While it is true that government debt is a
claim on future labour income, the majority of this
debt is short term and produces income flows that
are fixed nominal coupons. Claimants to this debt
may benefit from avoiding the repercussions of a
slowdown in the economy, but they do not enjoy
the gains from a growing Canadian economy as
would claimants to a security such as a Trill, which
would grow with GDP. 
Corporate profits (including those generated by
private equity firms) represent approximately 20
percent of Canadian GDP. Without access to
direct claims on future labour income, which
makes up the bulk of the remaining income flows
in Canada and hence the bulk of the wealth of the
nation, pensioners are restricted to the return from
holding capital. During the 20th century baby
boom, the capital/labour split of corporate income
may have favoured the relatively scarce resource of
capital. But in the 21st century, labour is likely to
become relatively scarce, and returns to capital will
likely decline. 
If afforded the opportunity to invest in Trills,
investors could insulate themselves from declining
returns to capital and ever more expensive labour
costs. Even if the capital/labour split of corporate
income remains steady in the coming decades, the
opportunity to purchase this new class of security
brings with it the potential for higher returns that
exhibit less volatility over time, the classic win-win
of diversification. 
The target-income funds, or life-cycle funds,
that are newly popular in Canada are designed for
people in a specified age cohort. For example, the
Scotia Vision Conserv 2030 Portfolio invests for
those planning to retire in 2030, while the Fidelity
ClearPath 2045 Sr A plan invests for people who
want to leave the work force in 2045. These funds
have high equity exposure when their participants
are young and reduce the exposure as they age. 
In the future, they could better fulfill their basic
mission by taking a dynamic portfolio strategy
involving Trills. Ideally, they would hold a
relatively small proportion of their portfolio in
Trills (or even short Trills) when their participants
are still young, so as to reduce their exposure to the
risks of the economy and their labour income. 
As participants approach retirement, when their
welfare increasingly depends on investments rather
than labour income, the funds would invest
progressively more heavily in Trills. 
Holders of Registered Retirement Saving Plans
(RRSPs) could also benefit from options that are
tailored to their individual circumstances. The
RRSP could, for example, hold investments in
target-income funds that optimize Trill holdings.
As we outline below, estimating the return to
holding a Trill is fairly straightforward. Standard
mean-variance (return versus risk) optimization
over asset classes, including the estimated return to
holding Trills, suggests that Trills would allow
investors a return very nearly as high as that of the
TSX, with half the volatility. Indeed, investors 
gain a much higher return and lower volatility
than if Trills are excluded from the mix. This
mean-variance optimization produces an optimal
portfolio composition of 47 percent of assets in
long-term bonds, 17 percent in the TSX index and
36 percent in Trills. Thus, the addition of Trills to
the asset mix available today would likely have a
dramatic impact on investor portfolio composition
and investor well-being. 
Why Ottawa Should Introduce Trills
The benefits and the costs to Canadians more
generally are of primary concern when considering
the introduction of the Trill. While a positive
argument can be made for investors holding this
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 271 | 3
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new security, an important question is whether
issuing Trills make sense for the issuer, the
Government of Canada. Is the investor’s gain the
taxpayer’s loss? 
To understand if a case can be made for issuing
these new securities, it helps to consider the
current objectives of the government with respect
to issuing debt obligations, and look forward to
the challenges of managing the nation’s wealth.
The Government of Canada issues very few classes
of securities, but ensures that the issued securities
are both easily marketed at favourable yields and
traded in liquid, well-functioning markets. An
explicit statement of the Government of Canada’s
debt policy can be found in the 2007 budget plan.
The main objective of the federal debt strategy is 
to raise stable and low-cost funding to meet the
operational needs of the Government. An associated
objective is to maintain a well-functioning Government
of Canada securities market, which helps to keep debt
costs low and contributes to efficient capital markets 
by providing important pricing and hedging tools.
(Annex 3.) 
So the first priority of the government, in normal
times, is to raise stable and low cost funds for
government activities. Stability and low cost are
actually competing goals, as the short-term
securities issued by the government are typically
cheapest to issue, but also exhibit the most
volatility in yield over time. We will discuss the
second priority – maintaining efficient financial
markets – after careful consideration of the cost
and stability of funds associated with issuing Trills.
The Cost of Borrowing
To preview our results, the cost of Trills would
likely be little more than 1 percentage point above
that of short-term government debt (the return to
Trills would be from the coupon and the capital
gains), and the coupon yield would be very low, in
the same range as RRBs. The competing goal of
stable funding for the government clearly favours
the introduction of the Trill. A fiscal planner,
concerned with the cost of servicing debt in a
recession, would view the Trill as a natural hedge
against budget shortfalls – the coupon paid on the
Trill will track government revenues as both rise
and fall with the GDP.
What features enable low-cost funding?
Basically, any security that moves risk away from
the investor and onto the issuer will be more
highly valued by investors and therefore entail a
lower cost for the issuer. Still, it seems likely that
the cost of issuing Trills would be higher than that
of issuing fixed-coupon, inflation-protected debt. 
The inflation-protected RRBs already issued by
the Government of Canada have a number of
features that are attractive to investors. There is
virtually no default risk with RRBs (likely no 
more than a Trill would pose), there is little or no
inflation risk (which is similar to the inflation
protection afforded by the Trill) and, unlike the
coupon from a Trill, the RRB is fixed in real terms.
In good times and bad, an investor gets a known,
risk-free real return. 
The coupon from the Trill, on the other hand,
will vary with the GDP of the economy. This is
good for the issuer, the Government of Canada,
because when the economy is expanding rapidly
and the Trill pays more to the investor, the
government has better tax revenues and hence
better ability to pay. When times are bad, the Trill
pays (relatively) less, which is also good for the
government because this is exactly when tax
revenues fall. 
For some investors, in good times there is less
need for a big coupon from the Trill – all of an
investor’s income sources are likely paying off in
good times. In bad times, when the investor may
really need the money, the Trill is paying less. In
the language of financial economists, the Trill
exposes investors to systematic risk and insures the
government against it. These investors will need to
be compensated for bearing this risk. For other
investors, including pension funds, this
disadvantage comes with an important offsetting
advantage: Trills will provide higher incomes when
their wage-indexed liabilities are growing more
quickly in booms, and lower incomes when their
wage-indexed liabilities are growing more slowly 
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These cross-cutting considerations make it
difficult to estimate whether Trills or regular fixed-
coupon nominal debt will be cheaper for the
Government of Canada to issue. Trills provide
inflation protection while fixed-coupon, nominal
debt provides fixed (albeit nominal) income flows.
A more formal way of estimating the cost of capital
associated with issuing Trills is through an exami-
nation of Canadian GDP’s historical record. By
treating GDP as a dividend and using tools for
pricing income-producing assets, we can estimate
the price and return of a Trill.
The valuation of any income-producing asset first
requires an estimate of the risk premium
1
demanded by investors. Standard techniques to
evaluate an asset’s risk exposure rely on the
availability of returns to that asset. To begin, one
must estimate what a Trill might be worth, and then
estimate how returns to a Trill would vary over time
and co-vary with other risky assets. We apply a
conservative estimate of the risk premium, using the
premium investors expect for holding risky equities
as a proxy for the premium investors would no
doubt expect when holding a Trill. We employ an
extension of the Gordon Model (1962) developed
by Donaldson and Kamstra (1996). 
THE GORDON GROWTH MODEL
The Gordon Growth Model discounts expected future
cash flows, defining the price (P) of an asset as equal to
the next period’s cash flow (D) divided by the discount
rate (r) minus the growth rate (g) of cash flows: P=D/(r-
g). Extensions we consider allow time-varying discount
and dividend growth rates.
This valuation exercise will provide a lower bound
on the value of a Trill and an upper bound on the
cost of capital to the issuer, the Government of
Canada. The Donaldson – Kamstra (DK)
technique permits extremely complex scenario
analysis that is otherwise infeasible, considering
scenarios in which the income-flow growth rates
and/or the risk premium never settle down and
possibly influence each other as well. Details on
this procedure and related issues can be found in
the Appendix.
Figure 1 displays DK prices and associated yields
for the TSX index (prices in Panel A, yields in
Panel B) and what they would have been for Trills
(Panels C and D) from the early 1960s to 2005,
with prices normalized so that each investment is
worth one dollar in 1966. Panels A and B also plot
realized market prices and yields for the TSX
index, which we will use to evaluate the success of
the DK procedure. If the DK procedure is helpful,
then the prices and yields it produces should
capture the main features of the market price and
yield – rapid appreciation over the past 40 years
with remarkably low dividend yields. 
Although the estimated prices (the line indicated
with squares in Panel A) fall well below market
prices (the line indicated with solid dots in Panel
A) for the late 1990s, the estimated and actual
prices generally move together. Indeed, the actual
and fitted yields are highly correlated with a
coefficient of more than 0.85. Altogether,
application of the Donaldson-Kamstra approach 
to pricing the Canadian equity market lends some
confidence to the notion that the DK estimated
prices for the Trill would be a good first
approximation to market prices, and that the
estimated yields should not be wildly off the mark.
If anything, the estimated prices and yields for the
Trill are conservative, underpricing the asset and
overestimating the required yield, because this
method takes no account of the particular benefits
these securities will offer to investors – pension
funds in particular – that currently have no access
to this type of asset.
Panels C and D of Figure 1 display estimated
prices and yields respectively for Trills from the
early 1960s to 2005, again with prices normalized
to equal one in 1966. As we saw for the TSX
index, prices increased dramatically in the 1990s.
The similarity to the TSX index is not coincidental
and comes from the favourable interest-rate
environment and declining equity premium,
C.D. Howe Institute
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which affects identically the value of the TSX
index and the Trill. 
The more dramatic increase in the plotted price
of the Trill relative to the TSX index comes from
the relatively rapid increase in the cash flow from
owning a Trill, combined with the low fade rate
2
of this cash flow growth. (An increase in the
growth rate of the Trill’s cash flow is expected to
persist much longer than that of the TSX index.)
In general, good news (or bad) is expected to
persist for the Canadian economy longer than for
public equity. Hence, the strong economic growth
of the 1990s would have led to very sharp increases
in the value of a Trill, even sharper than that of the
TSX index.
Given these results, it is likely that had Trills
been available, we would have seen very aggressive
appreciation in their price over the past half
century, perhaps even greater than we have seen for
the TSX index. The coupon yield on Trills (that is,
the cash-flow-to-price ratio) would have been
lower than the dividend yield on the TSX index,
though the two would have been similar in
magnitude. 
The estimated coupon yield for Trills is attractive
from the perspective of the issuer, hovering just
above 1 percent in 2005 and typically resting
below 2.5 percent. This compares very favourably
with the yield offered on Treasury bonds, both real
return and nominal coupon. The average total
return to holding a Trill over the last half century
would have been just over 12.5 percent, versus
11.5 percent for the TSX index, just under 
10 percent for long-term bonds and a little over 
7 percent for one-year Treasury bills (all in
nominal terms). This high total return (and cost to
the government of issuing Trills) is an outcome of
the risk premium we imposed in our scenario
analysis. Lowering our assumed risk premium
lowers the total return to the Trill, but does not
alter the dynamics of the return appreciably. 
Another way to calculate the cost of capital
relevant to issuing Trills is by estimating a Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) beta for the Trill;
calculating the degree of correlation between the
return on the Trill and the market return (typically
proxied by the overall stock index). While the
return to a Trill itself should be the appropriate
measure of the total market return, since the Trill
represents a claim on the GDP of the entire
Canadian economy, we use a classic CAPM
estimation for the purposes of evaluating the risk
and appropriate reward for holding a Trill. Our
analysis measures the amount of the TSX index
return that is in excess of the Treasury bill return.
The market excess return this CAPM regression
produces a beta of approximately 0.30, showing
that the Trill is clearly a low-risk asset. 
The CAPM estimate of the required rate of return
is 8.35 percent, indicating a risk premium of only
1.35 percent, about 2 percentage points lower than
the conservative estimate we imposed to estimate the
price of Trills, versus a premium of virtually zero for
long-term nominal government debt. 
So even before taking into account the
additional willingness-to-pay of investors who
would find Trills uniquely attractive, we conclude
that the cost of Trills would likely be low, and
possibly less than some outstanding government
securities. The competing goal of stable funding
for the government, moreover, potentially
counterbalances any higher cost of borrowing.
Georges (2003) shows that considerations of the
overall budget balance through the business cycle
can impact optimal debt management. Traditional
analysis of debt management emphasizes debt
maturity structure as a choice between low cost but
volatile short-term debt and higher cost but more
stable long-term debt. Georges (2003) points out
that a fiscal planner would typically be most
concerned with the risk that the cost of servicing
debt jumps up at a time when the government
budget can least afford it, say in a recession. This
echoes a motivation for the offering of real return
bonds in Canada: the value of diversifying
government debt obligations to reduce the risk of a
budget crisis, even if this diversification increases
the average cost of borrowing to the government.
3
2 Fade rate refers to the speed of a reversal to a baseline level.
3 We are grateful to Nicholas Le Pan for his insights on the process leading up to the adoption of RRBs in Canada.Commentary 271 | 7
Liability management issues lead directly to the Trill
as a natural hedge against budget shortfalls – the
coupon paid on the Trill would track government
revenues as both rise and fall with the GDP.
Variants on the Trill could include bonds with
coupons based on national income or consumption,
or even tax revenues. Like GDP, these economic
statistics are commonly revised over time. For
example, a given year’s final GDP figure may not be
known with certainty for some time. Nevertheless,
dividends are routinely paid to shareholders based
on preliminary corporate earnings estimates, not
final figures restated years later. Choosing a fixed
date on which to determine the Trill’s
coupon, say three months after fiscal
yearend, and using the real-time GDP
estimate available at that time, would
enhance investors’ understanding of
the income stream provided by a Trill.
Maintaining Efficient Financial
Markets for Currently Available
Debt Instruments
The impact of Trills on financial markets is an
important consideration from the perspective of
the Government of Canada. How would room be
made for Trills without compromising traditional
debt markets? It may be difficult to substitute Trills
for conventional debt as it comes due. Capital
markets rely on the term structure of Government
of Canada nominal debt as a reference point for
pricing other fixed-coupon nominal debt, and as a
hedging instrument. This debt is also used to park
wealth by foreigners seeking a safe haven from
political and economic instability. 
The current and ongoing reduction of the
federal debt is already constraining the Canadian
government’s financing choices. So reduction of
outstanding nominal-coupon debt to make room
for a new debt instrument is unlikely. If it is not
possible to make room for Trills in the regular
issuance of government securities, there is a way
forward: using the proceeds from the sale of Trills
to fund federal government obligations that are
currently unfunded, thus ensuring that the net
indebtedness of the government does not increase. 
Potential Uses for Proceeds from Trills
The most obvious use of the proceeds of Trills 
in the nearer term would be the funding of
currently unfunded government obligations. 
A precedent for this change would be the
government’s 2000 move to fund future employee
pensions: rather than adding a book-keeping
entry to its unfunded pension liabilities every
year as previously, the federal government now
issues additional funded debt and is building a
pension fund administered by an arm’s-length
board to invest in order to pay future pension
benefits. The federal government
still has many unfunded obligations
on its books – for example, the fair
value of other employee and veteran
future benefits as of March 31,
2007, was estimated at $62.8 billion
(Receiver General of Canada 2007,
p. 2.18). Establishing investment
funds to cover these and other
liabilities is arguably desirable in its
own right, and would permit the federal
government to issue large amounts of Trills
without affecting its net indebtedness or reducing
outstanding securities of other kinds.
Another potential use of the proceeds from the
sale of Trills would be an investment fund similar to
those established to manage budget surpluses in
many countries around the world, such as Norway’s
Government Pension Fund, and Canada’s own
Alberta Heritage Fund. The government would
want to invest the proceeds from the sale of Trills to
earn sufficient returns to cover their coupon
payments. To the extent there are surpluses and
shortfalls in the income flows from such a fund,
these could be used to stabilize government
revenues. In this way, government cash flows would
be less vulnerable to macroeconomic surprises such
as those resulting from the Canadian economy’s
traditional reliance on oil and raw materials. Such a
fund would face governance issues, and the prop-
osition that the government can deploy such funds
more effectively than private investors would strike
many Canadians as doubtful. To mitigate this, we
recommend that the proceeds from issuing Trills be
pooled in a fund similar to that managed by the
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board. They
should be used to invest in international assets only,
which would both promote diversification and
prevent political influence from directing the
investments toward (low-return) special-interest
domestic projects.
Should the Government of Canada decide to
issue Trills, we expect other countries to follow suit
over time, just as Finland’s introduction of Real
Return Bonds in 1946 led to many other nations
following suit. The availability of Trills issued by
countries around the world would present an
opportunity for nations to buy each other’s Trills,
using the proceeds from the sale of their own Trills.
This would result in the pooling of income across
nations and the reduction of the volatility of those
nations’ income streams, because different nations’
business cycles are less than perfectly correlated.
4
This is an attractive prospect: if developing
countries were to issue Trills and purchase
developed countries’ Trills, the booms and busts
the developing countries experience would have a
muted impact on their ability to provide basic
services and to manage their own debt obligations.
Emerging market economies have perhaps the
most to gain from the introduction of Trills, but
the prospect of a developed economy sharing in
the growth of these emerging economies should be
reward enough for providing this free-market-
priced insurance policy. 
Who Would Buy Canadian Trills?
While we expect pension funds and individual
Canadians would line up to purchase Trills, they
may not be the only interested parties. Foreigners
would also be potential purchasers. As noted in the
previous section, purchases of other countries’
Trills would offer a new and valuable kind of
international diversification.
Should we be concerned with foreigners owning
this sort of claim on Canada’s income? We do not
think so. First of all, foreigners are already allowed
to own Canadian Government debt, so Trills set
no precedent. Furthermore, if Trill-equivalents
from other countries become available to
Canadians, the resulting exchange of claims would
be of great value to Canadian pension fund
managers (and fund managers from around the
world) because of the benefits of diversification.
Business cycles of nations, while correlated, do not
move in lock step, and the availability of assets that
perfectly track GDP cycles of nations from around
the world would provide a new asset class for
diversification, an important contribution of Trills.
Trills even offer the potential to stabilize world
economies by increasing international interconnec-
tivity and reducing the incentive of governments
to engage in mutually destructive trade wars.
Similar Securities from Around the World
The first proposal we know of for a true GDP-
linked bond came from Shiller in 1993. In Macro
Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s
Largest Economic Risks he draws comparisons
between a firm’s earnings and a country’s GDP,
and describes the same GDP-linked security that
we propose here. 
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) sought to revive
the case for GDP-growth-linked bonds, Kruse,
Meitner and Schroder (2005) detail how to price
bonds with coupons tied to the growth of the
GDP, and Griffith-Jones and Sharma (2006)
outline the benefits of introducing GDP-linked
bonds and document various countries’ efforts to
establish such instruments. To the best of our
knowledge, no country has issued true GDP
shares. In the mid-1990s, bonds with attached
GDP warrants were issued by Bulgaria, Bosnia and
Costa Rica in concert with their Brady Plan
restructurings. These bonds included clauses to
increase coupon payments at predetermined GDP
thresholds rather than smoothly with the GDP. 
In 2001, Singapore issued the New Singapore
Shares, which pay a 3 percent return plus the
economic growth rate of Singapore, if positive,
rather than a coupon tied to the GDP level.
Argentina’s 2005 GDP warrants are a fairly
complicated financial instrument. Payments are
linked to the growth of the economy, rather than
the level of the GDP, and are conditional on threeCommentary 271 | 9
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criteria being met simultaneously. First, real GDP
must be at a higher level than a predetermined
baseline GDP. Second, real growth of GDP must
be greater than a baseline growth. Finally, there is a
total payment cap. 
In contrast, the Trill would be as simple and
familiar as shares in corporations. We believe that
transparency and simple structure are essential to
establishing demand for these securities and
ensuring that their market is liquid. Tying the
Trill’s payment to the level of the GDP of Canada
would accomplish these goals.
While a few countries have experimented with
GDP-bond-like instruments, a
sensible question to ask is why there
has been no attempt to issue a true
GDP bond. There are several possible
reasons for the limited interest to
date. First, it is plausible that
government Treasury officials do not
perceive any need to issue such a
security. The primary obligation of
any country’s Treasury (as it is commonly
perceived) is to enable low-cost financing for
government’s operational needs. Treasuries are not
generally perceived as having a risk-management
role. Investors will typically be willing to pay a
higher price for fixed-coupon debt than for GDP
bonds whose coupons would fluctuate with the
economy’s performance. Hence, fixed-coupon debt
and, especially, real-return debt will normally be
relatively cheaper for the government to issue. Our
own analysis indicates the cost of issuance of the
Trill will be in the order of 135 basis points above
other government debt. 
It is likely no coincidence that the countries that
have experimented with GDP-bond-like
instruments have typically been those facing debt
crises; those with few or no alternative options for
issuing low-cost debt. Just as new, risky firms have
trouble accessing low-cost public debt markets and
instead turn to issuing higher cost instruments such
as new equity, the countries that have explored the
possibility of issuing GDP-like bonds have been, for
the most part, those with few other options than to
be innovative in their search for capital.
Another reason for Ottawa’s limited interest in
issuing GDP bonds likely arises from the
secondary objective of the Canadian government’s
debt policy – to ensure the efficiency of the market
for government securities. To date, the government
has sensibly focused its efforts on providing
liquidity to the traditional nominal-coupon bond
market. Without the regular and routine issue of
large quantities of new nominal government debt,
the market for nominal debt instruments cannot
function properly. 
This pressure to promote government debt
market liquidity has a tendency to mitigate any
potential interest in exploring new
debt instruments. Even in the US,
where there is a growing federal debt,
the Treasury experiences continuing
high demand for nominal Treasury
notes, bonds and bills. In Canada,
where the government is reducing the
size of the national debt and
consequently reducing the need to
issue new bonds, there is additional pressure to
keep Treasury markets liquid.
There is a possibility that Trills could be
privately issued. But Trills, by their very nature, are
most naturally issued by a national government. 
A national government can most effectively hedge
the claims provided by a GDP bond with both 
the right to tax income and the ability to invest
proceeds from issuing the GDP bond in other
nations’ similar securities. 
Notwithstanding their novelty and these
reservations, however, we feel that Trills would be a
useful addition to the range of available government
securities in Canada. Pension funds in Canada are
larger than ever, and the good fit between this type
of asset and their liabilities suggests to us that there
would be a lively appetite for Trills, and that Trills
would be issueable at reasonable cost to the
government. Importantly, moreover, we think 
that by funding currently unfunded liabilities, the
federal government could issue Trills without either
increasing its net indebtedness or hurting the
liquidity and completeness of the markets for other
government securities.
Trills would be a useful
addition to the range
of available
government securities
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Conclusions
A Trill is essentially an equity stake in Canada’s
economy. When publicly traded companies issue
equity rather than debt, they typically do so
because debt markets are not available to them or
the addition of more debt to their capital structure
would unacceptably increase their risk of
bankruptcy. Given a choice, incumbent equity
holders would rather not have to share with others
the growth potential of a company. For the
introduction of Trills to make sense for Canadians,
it must be the case that the availability of an equity
stake in Canada solves some problem that issuing
debt cannot solve. 
We believe this new debt instrument would be
of interest to the Canadians for its stabilizing
influence on the budget (as the Trill’s coupon
payments would fall with declining budget
revenues), in contrast to the menu of fixed-coupon
debt instruments currently available. Our
valuation of the Trill indicates its yield would be
very attractive to the issuer, the Government of
Canada, and Trills would, at the very least, provide
a convenient tool to fund federal government
obligations that are currently unfunded, making
government finances more transparent.
We have made a case that Trills would also help
pension plans diversify into inflation-protected
assets tied to the wealth of the nation and would
allow individuals planning for retirement to enjoy
the benefits of real economic growth in Canada. In
the language of financial economists, the current
menu of available assets is incomplete. There are
risks in the economy, related specifically to human
capital and the GDP, that cannot be traded in
existing financial markets. (The risks associated
with companies’ fortunes, in contrast, can be
traded in existing equity and corporate bond
markets.) For investors seeking a return tied to
Canadian labour productivity and the overall
growth in the economy, there is simply no
substitute for the Trill. Introducing Trills would
help complete financial markets, which would lead
to better diversification and hedging possibilities
for everyone.
Standard financial analysis suggests that Trills
would provide the issuer, the Government of
Canada, with a budget-stablizing, moderate-cost
debt instrument, and  investors with an asset that
cannot be replicated with existing assets, allowing
investors new portfolio diversification strategies
that preserve high returns and lower volatility. The
issuer and the investors in Trills would both stand
to gain from Trills, another case of win-win
through financial innovation and diversification. Since the Trill is a security that is not now
available, its price and return can be only
estimated. We present two valuation exercises
here, one being the projected valuation of a Trill,
the other being the valuation of the Canadian
publicly traded equity market, proxied using the
Toronto Stock Exchange-Canadian Financial
Markets Research Center (TSX-CFMRC)
indices for the TSX market. The most recent
data from the CFMRC are the monthly closing
S&P/TSX index prices and total returns.
Analysis of a priced asset facilitates a comparison
between the observed value and the estimated
value. Presumably, if the valuation technique
works well for pricing the TSX index, we can
lean on it to price the Trill. 
A large variety of methods have been proposed
for the valuation of equity, and these are
applicable as well to Trills. The best-known
methods are based on the Gordon Growth
Model of constant dividend growth and constant
discount rates. The Gordon Model, which
discounts expected future cash flows, defines the
price of an asset as equal to the next period’s cash
flow divided by the  discount rate minus the
growth rate of cash flows. For example, if the
next period cash flow is expected to be $1, the
discount rate is 10 percent and the growth rate
of cash flows 5 percent, then the Gordon Model
would indicate a price of $20 (P=$1/(0.1-0.05).
While the notion of constant discount rates
and dividend growth rates is simple to work
with, more realistic models of dividends and
discount rates have been developed, including
models that embed a fixed probability of
maintaining the dividend payment at current
levels and a probability of raising it. 
One early model, based on methods developed
by Campbell and Shiller (1988), was used by
Shiller (1993), but that method as applied to
GDP took no account of changing discount rates. 
The Additive Markov Gordon model (see
Equation 1 of Yao 1997) and the Geometric
Markov Gordon model (see Equation 2 of Yao
1997) are more recent examples of equity
valuation models. They still impose constant
discount rates, meaning that investor risk
aversion and market interest rates are constant,
which seems improbable. 
Another extension of the Gordon Model,
developed by Donaldson and Kamstra (1996),
permits predictably changing and auto-correlated
dividend growth and discount rates. This auto-
correlation can be understood as a fade rate; that
is, the speed at which a rate converges to its
long-run stable rate. The more auto-correlation,
the slower the fade and the higher the value of
the asset experiencing a (temporarily) higher-
than-average growth in cash flows. We have not
fully resolved our differences on the extent to
which the volatility of markets can be explained
in terms of a rational model, but agree that it is
useful to consider such models.
To appreciate the importance of fade rates in
valuation, take the example of a firm with two
equally likely scenarios for cash-flow growth
rates. Under one scenario, the rate decreases
from its past average of 10 percent to 7 percent.
Under the other, the average rate increases to 13
percent. Once changed, the average rate remains
constant. 
Before the change in growth rates, the
expectation is for an average growth of 10
percent, as it has been before any change. If the
discount rate is expected to be 15 percent and
the most recent dividend was one dollar, then
the classic Gordon Growth Model would yield a
price of $1/(0.15-0.10) or $20 per share. 
However, if we recognize that cash-flow
growth rate changes are permanent (an extreme
form of auto-correlation, with no fade back to
the average), then the Gordon prices should be
calculated for each scenario separately and the
two prices averaged to get a price that accounts
for this auto-correlation. The low cash-flow
growth rate case yields a price of $1/(0.15-0.07)
or $12.50 per share, and the high-rate case yields
a price of $1/(0.15-0.13) or $50.00 per share, 
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Appendix: Valuation of the Trillfor an average price of $31.25. Accounting for
the fade rate dramatically changes the price
estimate, increasing it by more than 50 percent. 
Very similar numbers result if we use discount-
rate changes instead of cash-flow growth rate
changes. Even more dramatic examples can be
constructed if both discount rates and cash-flow
growth rates move in opposite directions. While
it is straightforward to adjust the Gordon Model
for a simple scenario like this, the Donaldson
and Kamstra (1996) technique permits
extremely complex scenario analysis that is
otherwise infeasible, scenarios in which the cash-
flow growth rate and/or the discount rate never
settle down, and possibly influence each other as
well. For more detailed descriptions of all these
techniques, see Kamstra (2003).
Regardless, for all of these valuation
techniques we need to establish the growth rate
of cash flows, the cash flows themselves and the
discount rate. Discount rates are often formed as
the sum of a short-term, risk-free rate and a risk
premium, the approach adopted here. The
equity or risk premium is the premium investors
demand before the fact, when the decision to
invest in risky assets like equities instead of risk-
free debt is first made. 
A downward-trending equity premium also
needs to be incorporated, with a total drop of
100 basis points over the period considered, the
last half century. This includes a sudden drop of
50 basis points in the early 1990s. Including this
decline in the equity premium is motivated by
recent work of Pástor and Stambaugh (2001).
The literature on the equity premium is large,
continuously growing and much too vast to fully
cite here. For recent work, see Bansal and Yaron
(2004), Graham and Harvey (2005) and Jain
(2005). For excellent surveys see Kocherlakota
(1996), Siegel and Thaler (1997), Mehra and
Prescott (2003) and Mehra (2003). 
The average dividend yield on the TSX index
over roughly the last half century has been
slightly more than 3 percent, though it has
trended down remarkably, now hovering around
1.5 percent. Cash-flow growth has averaged
about 5 percent and has been quite variable,
with dividends falling more than 10 percent in
some years and growing well in excess of 20
percent in others. 
Growth in dividends shows little persistence or
predictability, in contrast to one-year T-bill rates,
which are highly persistent (i.e., exhibiting a very
low fade rate). T-bill rates have averaged just less
than 7 percent over the last half century, from as
low as almost 2 percent to more than 15 percent.
Even incorporating very low-risk premia, simple
Gordon Growth Models imply much lower
prices for the TSX index, and much higher yields
than are seen in the market, so we do not
employ these techniques for the pricing of Trills. 
Using a risk premium that averages 3.5
percent, starting at 4 percent in the early 1960s
and declining to 3.4 percent by 2005 (as implied
by Donaldson, Kamstra, and Kramer, 2007 and
Graham and Harvey, 2005), incorporating a
slow fade rate for discount rates and a very rapid
fade for cash-flow growth rates, and using the
technique of Donaldson and Kamstra (1996), we
find much more reasonable prices and yields
than can be produced by the Gordon Growth
models. Indeed, these results closely match the
actual market prices and yields. (See Figure 1,
Panels A and B in the main text.)
Had the Government of Canada issued Trills
for the last half century, the growth rate of the
cash flow from this asset would have averaged
roughly 8.4 percent (nominal) annually, from as
low as approximately zero to as high as
approximately 20 percent. This annual growth
rate is about half as volatile as the TSX index
cash-flow growth rates over the same period. As
well, the growth rate of this cash flow would be
strongly auto-correlated, in contrast to the cash-
flow growth rates of the TSX index. Again, using
an average risk premium of 3.5 percent,
incorporating a slow fade rate for discount rates,
a slow fade rate for cash-flow growth rates and
the technique of Donaldson and Kamstra
(1996), we find a price appreciation of Trills
from the 1960s to the present that is even more
remarkable than for the TSX index. This growth
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is driven largely by two factors: the relatively
high growth rate in cash flows (GDP) and the
strong persistence in these growth rates. (See
Figure 1, Panels C and D in the main text.)
A separate but closely related question is whether
investors would hold a substantial portion of their
portfolio in Trills, if Trills were available. In order
to answer this question, we must compare the
risk, return and covariance of the return from
holding Trills with other risky assets. Consider a
three-risky-asset world (the TSX index, long-term
government bonds and Trills), plus a risk-free asset
(the one year T-bill rate). Over the past half
century, the returns to these assets are 11 percent,
10 percent, 12.5 percent and 7 percent for 
the risk-free asset (the one year T-bill rate). The
volatilities of these assets are 16 percent, 
11 percent, 16 percent and zero, respectively. The
covariances of these assets indicate a small positive
correlation between the TSX index and the Trill,
zero correlation between long-term bonds and the
TSX index and negative correlation between the
Trill and long-term bonds. Standard mean-
variance produces an optimal  portfolio
composition of 47 percent of assets in long-term
bonds, 17 percent in the TSX index and 36
percent in Trills. 
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